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1“STUDENT DEMOGRAPHICS, TEACHER SORTING AND 
TEACHER QUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM THE END OF
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION”
C. Kirabo Jackson    Draft Date Jan 5, 2009. 
Abstract: The re-shuffling of students due to the end of student busing in Charlotte-
Mecklenburg provides a unique opportunity to investigate the relationship between 
changes in student attributes and changes in teacher quality that are not confounded 
with changes in school or neighborhood characteristics. Comparisons of OLS and 
IV results suggest that the spatial correlation between teachers’ residences, 
students’ residences and schools could lead to spurious correlation between student
attributes and teacher characteristics. The re-shuffling of students led to teacher re-
sorting so that schools that experienced a repatriation of black students experienced 
a decrease in various measures of teacher quality (including estimated value-added).
I provide evidence that this was primarily due to a labor supply response.
1 Motivation and Introduction
Many education policy interventions, such as school vouchers, school choice, 
district consolidation and student busing, change the student demographics of schools. 
Such policies are predicated, in part, on the hypothesis that it is helpful to re-shuffle peers
while keeping other things roughly the same. While this may be true, it may be 
impossible to keep teaching “roughly the same” if teacher quality is endogenous to 
student characteristics. Since salaries do not vary across schools within a district, teachers 
have little financial incentive to teach at undesirable schools. Since observably better 
teachers will be hired over weaker teachers, and all teachers are likely to apply for the 
most desirable jobs, schools with undesirable working environments will have teachers of 
lower average quality. As such, if teachers prefer working environments with students of 
a particular demographic, teacher quality would be endogenous to student demographics
and, ceteris paribus, students who teachers find undesirable will be exposed to teachers 
of lower quality. With such teacher sorting, policies that change the composition of 
students may change the composition of teachers in unforeseen and undesirable ways. 
For example, the movement of high-quality teachers out of schools with growing black 
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2enrollment shares may be partially responsible for the costs of school segregation to 
black students documented by Guryan (2004) and Lutz (2005) and the finding that higher 
black enrollment shares are associated with lower test scores [Hanushek, Rivkin and Kain 
(2004) and Hoxby (2000)]. 
While the research is mixed, there is evidence that years of teaching experience, 
the selectivity of undergraduate institution, teachers’ test scores, and regular licensure are 
associated with higher student achievement [Brewer and Ehrenberg (1994); Hanushek 
(1997); Brewer and Goldhaber (2000); Anthony and Goldhaber (2007); Clotfelter, Ladd 
and Vigdor (2006)]. Studies that identify teachers associated with student test-score gains
show that a one standard deviation increase in teacher quality leads to between a tenth 
and a fifth of a standard deviation increase in math and reading scores [Rockoff (2004); 
Aaronson, Barrow and Sander (2007); Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain (2005)] and Jacob and 
Lefgren (2008) find that principals’ subjective evaluations of teachers are highly 
correlated with subsequent increases in student achievement.
Researchers have found that high-poverty schools tend to have teachers with 
lower qualifications than low-poverty schools and that teachers tend to leave schools with 
low-achieving, poor, minority students, particularly when there are vacancies at higher-
achieving, affluent schools. This evidence is based on observing teacher attributes, or 
changes in teacher attributes, at schools whose student populations are unchanging or are 
changing due to unobserved factors that could also affect teacher labor supply. I provide 
an overview of this literature and discuss why, based on previous studies, one cannot say 
whether the observed differences are caused by (a) school attributes that are correlated 
with student characteristics (b) neighborhood attributes that are correlated with student 
characteristics or (c) mobility of teachers toward their residences that happens to move 
them out of inner-city schools. Since previous studies have been unable to separate the 
effect of student characteristics on teacher quality from those of neighborhoods or 
schools, we have little knowledge of the direct relationship between student 
characteristics and teacher quality and little understanding of how policies that change the 
composition of students across schools might affect the distribution of teachers.
In 2002, Charlotte-Mecklenburg (CM) school district ended its long-standing 
school integration policy which entailed busing students across neighborhoods to 
3maintain racial balance of the student bodies across schools. Since CM schools were 
compelled to have student populations that were similar to the district average during 
busing, the demographic make-up of schools quickly converged to those of their
surrounding neighborhoods between 2002 and 20031 while other school attributes and 
neighborhood characteristics were largely unchanged.2 The sudden changes in student 
attributes within schools over time due to the policy change provide a unique opportunity 
to observe teachers’ reactions to exogenous changes in student attributes that were 
uncorrelated with changes in neighborhood and school characteristics. I exploit this 
policy change to overcome the limitations of previous studies to credibly uncover the 
causal effect of changes in student characteristics on changes in teacher quality.3 While a 
faculty desegregation order was issued in 1972, it had not been exercised in over twenty 
years and there was no change in the district’s hiring or teacher/principal placement 
practices over the sample period.4 Also, CM has a policy of not forcibly relocating 
teachers across schools. As such, I interpret changes in teacher mobility to be primarily a 
labor supply response. Conversations with district officials and empirical evidence 
suggest that the changes were not driven by changes in teacher demand so that this 
analysis may provide empirical evidence of the sorting suggested by the theory of 
compensating differences.
Since a racially integrated school in a predominantly black neighborhood would 
have experienced a larger repatriation of black students after busing ended than a 
predominantly black school in an identical neighborhood, I use the difference between 
the proportion of black students at the school and the proportion of black residents in its 
surrounding neighborhood before the policy change to predict the exogenous 
inflow/outflow of black students due to the policy change. While the policy change 
                                                
1 Throughout this paper I refer to school years by their ending calendar year. For example, the academic 
school year 2002-3 is referred to as 2003.
2 Only 48 percent of students in the county attended a school that deviated from the district average percent 
of minority students by more than 15 percentage points in 2000-1, while in 2004-5, after the policy change,
that number increased to 74 percent. Source: NAACP.
3 Other researchers have used this policy change in CM as a way to study the effects of school choice on 
student outcomes [Hastings, Kane and Staiger (2006); Hastings and Weinstein (2007); Hastings, Van 
Weelden and Weinstein (2007)] and to study the relationship between school characteristics and housing 
prices [Kane, Staiger and Riegg (2005)].
4 Employees from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg legal office, personnel office and superintendent’s office 
have all corroborated this statement. However, the superintendent has forcibly relocated two school 
principals after the sample period.
4allows me to observe exogenous movement of students, I am unable to disentangle race 
from other student characteristics associated with race. As such, as in other studies, 
student race is a summary statistic for a variety of student attributes and the results should 
be interpreted in that light.
I find that schools that had an inflow of black students, due to the policy change,
had a decrease in the share of high-quality teachers, as measured by years of experience
and certification test scores. Similar to Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien and Rivkin (2005), I use 
student achievement gains to estimate teacher value-added, which I use as a measure of 
unobserved teacher quality. I find that schools that had an inflow of black students also 
experienced a decrease in average estimated teacher effectiveness in math and reading. 
These changes were largely driven by changes in the attributes of teachers who remained 
in these schools – indicating that experienced, high scoring and high value-added 
teachers were relatively more likely to leave these schools. I find that black teachers were 
more likely to stay in these schools while white teachers were relatively unaffected – so 
that the percentage of black teachers increased in these schools. However, inflows of 
black students are associated with decreases in the average quality of both black and 
white teachers - suggesting that sorting by student race occurs both across and within 
teacher race. The relationship between teacher characteristics and student race differs in 
the within-school instrumental variables regressions and in the cross-section, suggesting 
that some of the well documented correlations are an artifact of residential segregation.
This paper presents the first compelling evidence that the relationship between student 
demographics and teacher quality may be causal.
The data show that teachers in all CM schools were more likely to leave their 
current school, and more specifically, were more likely to move to other schools in CM 
the year before students were re-assigned. Further, the direction of the flow of black 
students is not correlated with hiring more teachers (vacancies). Both of these patterns 
suggest the changes were not demand driven and were due to a labor supply response.
These patterns are consistent with a compensating differentials equilibrium where 
teachers have heterogeneous tastes for student attributes so that teachers re-sorted in the 
face of an anticipated change in working conditions. The findings suggest that the 
widening black-white achievement gap associated with residential and school segregation,
5and the negative relationship between student achievement and the percentage of black 
students at the school, are due, in part, to the endogeneity of teacher quality with respect 
to student characteristics. The findings underscore that policy-makers should be careful to 
consider how teachers may re-allocate themselves when students are moved across 
schools through vouchers, school choice, district consolidation, or school busing.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews the 
literature on teacher quality and student attributes. Section III describes the policy change 
and documents its effect on student characteristics. Section IV shows the effect of the 
policy change on teacher characteristics. Section V presents a graphical analysis of 
teacher turnover. Section VI uses disaggregated teacher data to explain the observed 
results in the aggregate, and section VII concludes. 
II Research on Student Attributes and Teacher Mobility 
It has been well documented that inner-city, high-poverty schools with high ethnic 
minority enrollment shares tend to have teachers with lower qualifications than low-
poverty schools [Betts, Reuben and Danenberg (2000), Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor and 
Wheeler (2007), Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2002), Scafidi, Sjoquist and 
Stinebrickner (2007) Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin (2003), Hanushek and Rivkin (2004)]. 
These researchers also find that low-income inner-city schools experience higher teacher 
turnover, particularly among white teachers, than affluent high-achieving suburban 
schools. While greatly informative, these studies compare the stock or the flow of 
teachers across schools where student attributes are either unchanging or changing for 
reasons that may exert an independent effect on teacher labor supply decisions.5
Tracking the movement of teachers across schools, researchers have found that 
teachers, particularly those with more experience, in schools with low-achieving students
move to higher-achieving schools - leaving high-poverty minority-majority districts with 
vacancies and unqualified instruction [Betts, Rueben and Danenberg (2000), Bohrnstedt 
and Stecher (1999); Lankford (1999), Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff (2002); Hanushek, 
                                                
5 As noted by several researchers, attempting to separate the contribution of student attributes from those of 
school or neighborhood attributes (which are highly collinear and jointly determined) is a dubious exercise 
without independent exogenous variation. While including school and neighborhood proxies can mitigate 
this problem, the strong colinearities between student demographics, school attributes and neighborhood 
attributes render this solution unsatisfactory.
6Kain and Rivkin (2004), Hanushek, Kain, O’Brian and Rivkin (2005)]. Hanushek and 
Rivkin (2004) find that this movement is stronger for white teachers than for black 
teachers, suggesting that teachers may prefer own-race students.
Analyzing New York teachers, Boyd, Lankford, Loeb and Wycoff (2005) find
that the geographic location of a school vis a vis where a teacher grew up plays a strong 
role in labor supply decisions. They find that teacher labor markets tend to be 
geographically very small and that teachers express preferences to teach close to where 
they grew up, which in turn tend to be close to their current residences. The implications 
of the geospatial nature of teacher labor markets are that the spatial correlation between 
teachers’ residential locations and those of the schools could generate both the cross-
sectional relationship and the dynamics documented by researchers even if teachers have
no preference for student or school attributes per se. 
Consider the observation that experienced teachers leave inner-city schools when 
there are vacancies at affluent, suburban schools and the observation that experienced 
teachers are less likely to teach at inner-city schools serving poor, minority populations. 
Since more experienced teachers are often given preference for new teaching positions, 
they have greater ability to express their preferences for schools. Since teachers, 
especially older teachers who are likely to have families, tend to live in suburban areas 
with reasonably good schools, their moving towards schools that are close to their homes 
will systematically move them out of inner-city schools that serve low-income, ethnic 
minority neighborhoods. In such a scenario, teachers’ endogenous movements, especially 
those of experienced teachers, would be due to the spatial correlation between school 
demographics, neighborhood characteristics and teachers’ residential locations rather 
than a reflection of teachers’ preferences for teaching at the schools per se. If the 
documented relationship between student and teacher attributes is an artifact of 
residential segregation, the interpretation of the evidence is very different, and policy 
prescriptions with regards to teacher recruiting and retention would be vastly different.6
                                                
6 For example, policies that improve the quality of neighborhoods surrounding a school may make it easier 
to attract teachers to schools with large ethnic minority shares. Alternatively, policies that make it easier to 
live farther away from schools in undesirable neighborhoods could improve teacher retention. Schools 
could also actively recruit teachers who grew up close by or in similar neighborhoods. However, if teachers 
react to the demographics of students rather than the neighborhoods of their schools, such policies would be 
largely ineffective.
7To address this spatial correlation bias, one would like to observe changes in 
teacher labor supply decisions at schools in which student demographics are changing, 
but for which the geospatial relationship between schools and their homes are unchanged. 
Given the limitations associated with observing endogenous movement of teachers across 
schools whose student populations are associated with a variety of other factors 
(including distance to home), the relatively sudden change in schools’ student 
demographics caused by the end of the desegregation order in CM may provide some 
new insights into the relationship between student attributes and teacher sorting. 
III The Policy Change and its Effect on Student Characteristics
In 1971 the United States Supreme Court held that busing was an appropriate way 
to ensure that all students would receive equal educational opportunities regardless of 
their race.7 Following this ruling, CM adopted a race-based student-busing policy so that 
many students attended schools that were not located in their own residential 
neighborhood. The plan stated that no school was to be more than fifty percent black and 
the “the burdens of busing” were to be shared equally. To achieve this goal, the plan used 
noncontiguous satellite zones and the pairing of inner-city black schools with outlying 
white schools.8 Since faculties were also segregated by race, teachers were re-assigned to 
schools in 1972 on the basis of their race.  After the initial period of reassignment, 
teacher race was not used in the placement or re-assignment of teachers to schools.9
Teachers who were dissatisfied with their schooling assignment in 1972 would have had 
almost three decades to undo any undesirable forcible relocation before the policy change 
in 2002. As such, any increased re-shuffling observed in 2002 can reasonably be 
attributed to changes in student characteristics.
During the period of student shuffling between 2002 and 2003, teacher 
assignment policies remained unchanged. Going as far back as 1990, the teacher 
                                                
7 Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
8 The plan was subsequently tweaked to accommodate the growth of the black student population and the 
emergence of magnet schools, but remained largely the same. Legal briefs from Capacchione v CM Board
of Education, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/briefs/belk.pdf
9 This statement has been verified by the following members of the CM Board of Education; the chief 
communications officer, lawyers at the CM office of general council and the director of the employee
relations. The logic of no longer enforcing the teacher desegregation order is that once students were 
integrated, teachers could not segregate themselves from students of another race.
8allocation system has operated as follows. Teachers in CM could either apply to the 
school district or they could apply for an advertised position at a particular school. 
Advertised positions are those that could not be easily filled by applicants in the general 
pool.10 For advertised positions, applications may be sent to several schools and the 
applicant is assigned to the first school that accepts her application. For other openings, 
principals are provided with a list of eligible applicants, who were selected from the pool 
of available candidates based on their qualifications and the school’s proximity to their 
home. The district is then notified of the principals’ selections from the list, and teachers 
who are not selected within this group are sent back to the applicant pool to be eligible 
for other positions. After being assigned, teachers are eligible for a voluntary transfer 
after having spent two years in their current position (unless they wish to move to an 
understaffed or underperforming school). The transfer application and assignment policy 
is identical to the application procedure for advertised positions in the district.
In 1997, the CM school system was sued by a parent charging that his daughter 
was twice denied entrance to a magnet school because the non-black slots were filled and 
she was not black. This suit was the catalyst for a lengthy legal battle that resulted in the 
implementation of a neighborhood-based school choice plan for the 2002-3 school year. 
Under the new policy, students are no longer bused into schools across neighborhoods 
and parents list three schools that they would like their child to attend. If the 
neighborhood school is the parents’ first choice, the student is guaranteed admission. If 
the parents’ most preferred school is not their neighborhood school, their child would 
have to enter a lottery in which low-income students are given preference. Those students
not admitted to one of their three choice schools are sent to their neighborhood school. 
Under the new plan, the likelihood that a student would attend a school outside of their 
own neighborhood is significantly reduced. 
I use school-level aggregate data from the Common Core of Data available from 
the National Center of Education Statistics for the years 2000 though 2005 to determine 
the impact of this policy change on the demographic make-up of students at CM schools. 
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For example, K-3 teaching positions are often not advertised since they are easy to fill from the existing 
applicant pool. In contrast, middle school and high school math teacher positions and exceptional children 
positions are often difficult to staff from the applicant pool and are therefore advertised specifically by the 
human resources division.
9I augment this dataset with school-level achievement and teacher data from the North 
Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC) and neighborhood (block group11) 
demographic data from the 2000 decennial census. Since CM is the largest and most 
urban school district in North Carolina, it is most appropriate to use other large urban 
school districts as comparison districts. The top panel of Table 1 summarizes the school-
level student demographic, achievement and census data for the busing years and the post 
busing years for schools in CM district, the three next largest school districts [Wake, 
Guilford, and Cumberland] and all other schools in North Carolina. Of the 152 CM 
schools in the sample between 2000 and 2005, 137 of them were in operation in 2002.  
Of these, 86 were primary schools, 29 were middle schools, 15 were high schools and 7 
did not fall into any of these categories.
It is clear that CM is not representative of North Carolina and that CM schools are 
much more similar to those in the three next-largest school districts. The CM schools are 
very similar in enrollment to the comparison schools, but much larger than other North 
Carolina schools. CM is the most urbanized district (about 81 percent of schools are in a 
large or mid-sized city) with the highest share of black students (about 49 percent) and 
the lowest share of white residents (about 59 percent). The comparison schools are 
somewhat less urbanized (almost 70 percent of schools are in a large or mid-sized city),
have lower black enrollment shares (about 41 percent) and a higher share of white 
residents (about 66 percent). In the rightmost panel, one can see that only 27 percent of 
schools in the rest of the state are located in a large or mid-sized city, the average black 
enrollment share is just over 30 percent, and whites make up 72 percent of the residents. 
The CM schools and those in the comparison districts are located in neighborhoods with 
median census household incomes between 46 and 49 thousand dollars a year, compared 
to only about 36 thousand dollars for the rest of the state. While all schools in the state 
became increasingly Hispanic during the sample period, there was a somewhat larger 
increase in CM schools. Across the two time periods, the percentage of students on free 
lunch went up about 7 points in CM compared to 4 points in comparison schools, and less 
than 1 point in other schools. 
                                                
11 Zip code data are used where block group data are not available.
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Table 1
2000-2002 2003-2005 2000-2002 2003-2005 2000-2002 2003-2005
Black Differential (2000) 13.96 13.96 12.55 12.55 8.81 8.81
(19.96) (19.96) (20.11) (20.11) (15.98) (15.98)
School Enrollment 762.16 837.66 724.79 727.58 556.57 561.57
(497.13) (524.19) (427.2) (447.66) (318.16) (332.08)
% Black Students 48.11 49.43 40.78 42.12 30.99 30.58
(18.93) (24.49) (21.61) (22.32) (26.5) (25.97)
% White Students 40.89 35.61 50.57 46.95 61.79 59.95
(21.59) (26.95) (22.33) (22.62) (27.88) (27.89)
% Hispanic Students 6.29 10.21 4.64 6.66 4.25 6.40
(6.61) (9.59) (3.99) (4.83) (5.55) (7.73)
% Asian Students 4.11 4.07 3.18 3.45 1.14 1.23
(2.41) (2.45) (3.21) (3.55) (2.35) (2.38)
% Students Free Lunch Eligible 38.01 44.90 32.05 36.02 37.29 37.63
(21.35) (27.4) (20.43) (21.67) (20.56) (23.49)
Median HH Income (2000 census) 48366 48272 47225 46868 35993 36031
(15612) (15774) (15805) (15598) (8068) (8154)
% Black Residents (2000 census) 35.30 35.30 28.03 28.03 22.69 22.69
(23.69) (23.69) (20.95) (20.95) (18.71) (18.71)
% White Residents (2000 census) 59.01 58.44 66.13 65.79 72.41 72.41
(23.15) (23.81) (20.99) (20.98) (20.2) (20.26)
City 0.80 0.82 0.66 0.72 0.26 0.27
(0.4) (0.39) (0.47) (0.45) (0.44) (0.44)
% At or Above Grade Level: Math 78.01 85.30 83.05 87.48 80.56 86.32
(13.42) (12.31) (12.53) (10.74) (14.39) (11.67)
% At or Above Grade Level: Reading 72.80 79.39 79.26 83.43 76.08 81.84
(14.53) (12.95) (13.2) (11.36) (14.14) (11.11)
% Teachers: 0-3 Years Experience 32.06 30.99 25.42 25.72 22.44 21.45
(12.1) (11.84) (11.88) (10.7) (11.) (10.39)
% Teachers: 4-10 Years Experience 27.33 30.36 26.49 27.60 24.96 26.22
(7.68) (8.17) (9.88) (8.78) (9.01) (8.77)
% Teachers: 11+ Years Experience 40.61 38.65 48.09 46.69 52.60 52.27
(11.42) (12.37) (13.41) (12.33) (12.9) (12.57)
One Year Teacher Turnover Rate* 27.65 25.23 24.94 22.85 21.39 18.98
(13.26) (13.06) (10.94) (10.41) (11.11) (10.21)
% Teachers: Black 23.78 24.57 20.91 23.44 13.41 13.45
(15.47) (17.56) (17.21) (18.14) (17.22) (18.25)
% Teachers: White 74.40 72.40 77.12 73.49 84.66 84.39
(15.81) (18.22) (17.64) (19.04) (18.61) (19.66)
% Teachers: Advanced Degree 19.59 21.66 17.37 18.10 11.70 11.94
(14.43) (15.09) (12.02) (12.81) (8.36) (8.7)
% Teachers: Score in Top 25% 47.12 47.86 46.59 48.55 42.56 45.24
(10.12) (11.18) (12.67) (13.43) (13.91) (14.22)
% Teachers: Score in Top 50% 73.28 75.55 71.92 74.39 69.76 71.54
(9.97) (9.67) (12.44) (12.39) (13.83) (13.66)
% Teachers: Top 100 College 9.06 12.80 12.87 15.46 7.94 10.00
(5.4) (6.33) (10.58) (11.31) (7.45) (8.76)
Number of Schools
Black Differential is defined as the percentage of black students at the school in the year 2000 minus the percentage of black 
residents in the census block group (or zip code if black group data are not available) of the school in the 2000 census. In Charlotte-
Mecklenburg this variables ranges from -31.34 to +57.06. Note that the teacher turnover rate is computed in sample so that errors in 
the data classification or missing data would lead to an inflated estimate of teacher turnover. This should not affect the regression 
results which are based on changes in this variable.
152 358 2220
Standard deviations in parentheses. The unit of observation is a school year, such that each school has one observation in each 
year in sample. Since the panel is not balanced due to new schools or school closings, variables that do not vary over time may 
change on average across time due to composition effects.
Summary statistics for CM, comparison districts (Wake , Guilford and Cumberland) and the rest of North Carolina: By pre and post 
policy change
Charlotte/Mecklenburg Comparison Districts Rest of North Carolina
To illustrate the effect of the policy change on the percent black in CM, Figure 1 
shows kernel density plots of the distribution of %Black in CM schools and comparison 
schools in the years before and after the policy change. Figure 1 shows that before the 
policy change (2000 – 2002), the distribution of %Black at the schools was relatively 
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similar between CM and the comparison districts. The figure also shows that the 
distribution of %Black became much more dispersed after the policy change (2003-2005) 
in CM, while there was almost no change for the comparison districts. 
The Black Differential (BD) variable at the top of Table 1 is the percentage of 
black students at the school in the year 2000 minus the percentage of black residents in 
the local neighborhood’s block group in the year 2000. This variable does not change for 
a school over time since it is based on data from the year 2000. Schools in CM and 
comparison districts are located in areas with about 13 percentage points more black 
students than percent black in the surrounding neighborhoods compared to 9 percentage 
points for other schools. This difference may be due to black families in North Carolina 
being more likely to have school-age children than white families, or it may reflect the 
fact that white households are more likely to send their children to private schools. The 
difference in the gap across school districts could also reflect greater private school going
for white students in urban environments.12
Figure 1
                                                
12 Even though the comparison districts did not have student busing during the sample period, they all did 
in the past so that old district lines still cross neighborhoods, where possible, to maintain diversity within 
schools. Wake County, the second largest county moved from a race-based to an income-based busing 
system in 2000, so there are still forces keeping the BD high in Wake. While Cumberland and Guilford do 
not have student busing policies, they both explicitly aim to maintain racial diversity across school districts 
when drawing and re-drawing school enrollment areas. 
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Figure 2
Since the busing policy that ended in 2002 maintained school integration despite 
much residential segregation, the schools that would be expected to have experienced the 
greatest change in student demographics are schools that had proportionately more blacks
or whites in the school than the surrounding area.13 A school with 10 percent black 
students located in an area with 50 percent black residents (a BD of minus 40) will have a 
larger inflow of black students at the end of busing than a school with 90 percent black 
students in a neighborhood in which 100 percent of the residents are black (a BD of 
minus 10). The BD predicts the outflow of black students that would occur if all schools 
had student populations that were exactly representative of the surrounding 
neighborhoods. A variable denoting post-busing, equal to one after 2002 and zero 
otherwise, would identify the year in which schools are most likely to have student 
populations that mirror the attributes of the surrounding neighborhoods. By interacting 
the BD variable with a “post” variable, one can predict the exogenous change in the share 
of black students that is due to the policy change. To illustrate this point, Figure 2 shows 
                                                
13 In regressions that predict the change in the percentage of black students in schools, the difference 
between the percent black in the school and the percentage of black residents in the neighborhood has a 
much larger F-statistic than simply using the percentage of black residents in the neighborhood.
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the relationship between the BD of a school in 2000 and the change in the percentage of 
black students between 2001 and 2002 (the year before the policy change) and between 
2002 and 2003 (the year of the policy change). 
On the left, the panel shows the sizable difference in the relationship between BD 
and changes in the percentage of black students before and after the 2002 policy change 
in Charlotte-Mecklenburg. As one would expect, the right panel shows very little 
difference over time for the comparison districts. The BD predicts small changes in the 
percentage of black students in a school for CM in the pre-policy year and for the 
comparison districts for all years, such that schools with negative BD’s (fewer blacks 
than predicted by the neighborhood) experienced small increases in the share of black 
students.14 In contrast, the BD predicts large changes in the percentage of black students 
in CM during the policy change year (2002-2003).  Figure 2 illustrates the mechanics of 
the instrument that uses the difference in the change in the relationship between BD and 
the percent black at the school before and after the policy change between CM and the 
comparison schools. Most schools that experienced large inflows of black/white students 
between 2002 and 2003 were located in predominantly black/white neighborhoods. As 
such, the instrument predicts the local average treatment effect – the effect of an 
inflow/outflow of black students on schools in largely black/white neighborhoods.
Figure 3
To show further that the BD variable predicts a sudden inflow/outflow of black 
                                                
14 Note that one cannot reject the hypothesis that the relationship between BD and within-school changes in 
percent black between 2001 and 2002 are the same in CM as in the comparison districts (at traditional 
levels). This indicates that the comparison districts may provide credible counterfactual changes.
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students between 2002 and 2003 above and beyond that in other years, I estimate the 
within-school change from 1998 levels in the proportion of black students for those CM 
schools with BDs above the 75th percentile and those CM schools with BDs below the 
25th percentile. Figure 3 shows that schools with BDs above the 75th percentile 
(predictive of an outflow of blacks) experienced a slight decrease in the share of black 
students between 2002 and 2003, while schools with BDs below the 25th percentile 
(predictive of an inflow of blacks) experienced an increase in the share of black students 
between 2002 and 2003. The figure suggests that the BD predicts relatively sudden 
differential changes in the share of black students the year of the policy change.15
The Effect of the Policy Change on Student Characteristics
To describe the change in student characteristics to which teachers were exposed 
(i.e. the treatment), I run regressions to determine the effect of the policy change on
various student characteristics. While the final analysis uses the percentage of black 
students as the treatment, teachers are exposed to all other student characteristics that are
associated with black students. Therefore, it is instructive to look at other student 
characteristics. It is useful to consider the student demographics regressions first stage 
regressions where the coefficients on the instruments predict the treatment that schools 
and teachers are exposed to.
Since the policy change had a differential effect on high-BD versus low-BD 
schools, one could, in principle, identify the effect of the policy change using a difference 
in difference (DID) estimator - comparing the difference in the change in outcomes 
between 2002 and 2003 across high-BD and low-BD schools in CM. This DID strategy 
would be valid if high-BD schools and low-BD schools would have experienced the same 
change in outcomes in the absence of the policy change. Since high-BD and low-BD 
schools are located in different neighborhoods and serve different populations, the 
assumption that they have the same underlying dynamics is implausible. In addition, 
statewide policies aimed at particular types of schools (e.g. low-income, low-performing) 
may have differential effects across school types and would invalidate the exclusion 
                                                
15 In addition to the movement of students across public schools, the change in the share of black students 
could also reflect movement of white students from private schools back into public schools that lost a 
large fraction of black students in 2003. 
15
restriction in a standard DID approach. For example, the North Carolina Bonus Program 
that paid teachers for locating in low-performing schools was implemented in 2001 and 
differentially affected teacher turnover across high and low income schools in 2002.
To address this concern, I use schools from the three next-largest school districts 
(Guilford, Wake and Cumberland) as comparison schools, allowing me to introduce 
another round of differencing and implement a difference in difference in differences 
(DIDID) estimator. 16 Identification in this triple differenced model compares the 
difference in the change in outcomes between high-BD and low-BD schools within CM
(which had the policy change) to that of other school districts (which did not have the 
policy change). The identifying assumption is that the difference in the change in 
outcomes between high-BD and low-BD schools in the comparison districts is the 
difference in the change in outcomes that would have occurred in CM between high-BD 
and low-BD schools had there been no policy change. Figures 1 and 2 suggest that this 
assumption is plausible. This assumption is more compelling than that for the standard 
DID approach since the DIDID approach will “net out” any statewide policies or 
differential migration that could have had a different time-effect across different types of 
schools. Since the predictor for an inflow of black students (the BD) is computed based 
on data in 2000, the estimation sample does not include data before 2000 to avoid any 
mechanical endogeneity between the instrument and the variables of interest.17 The first 
set of basic DIDID estimates are implemented by estimating the following equation by 
OLS on the schools in the four largest school districts in the state. All subsequent 
analyses are based on this sample of schools.
1 2 3it t i i t t i t i i itY POST CM BD POST POST BD POST CM                      [1]
Where itY is the outcome for school i at time t, POSTt is an indicator variable equal to 
one in the year 2003 onwards and zero otherwise, iCM is an indicator variable equal to 
                                                
16 There is an efficiency/consistency tradeoff in increasing the sample to all schools in North Carolina. 
Since CM is the largest and most urbanized school district in the state, restricting the comparison sample to 
other large, urban school districts is desirable. I chose the four largest school districts because the size and 
urbanicity of school districts changes rather suddenly as one goes beyond the first few districts. For 
example the year 2000 enrollments for the four largest districts were 103, 99, 63, and 51 thousand students. 
For the next three largest districts the enrollments were 44, 30 and 30 thousand. Restricting the analysis to 
the top three districts results in less power but does not change the results in any meaningful way. 
17 Excluding data for the year 2000 is unnecessary since all regression specifications are differenced.
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one if school i is in Charlotte-Mecklenburg and equal to zero otherwise, iBD is the black 
differential for school i, i is a school specific intercept, and it is the idiosyncratic error 
term. The school dummies i subsume the necessary one-way and two-way effects
between CM and BD. The parameter of interest is  , the coefficient on the three-way 
interaction t i iPOST CM BD  that predicts an outflow of black students.
Table 2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
%Black 
Students
%Black 
Students
%White 
Students
%White 
Students
% Student 
Free-
Lunch 
Eligible
% Student 
Free-
Lunch 
Eligible
% at 
Grade 
Level 
(Math)
% at 
Grade 
Level 
(Math)
% at 
Grade 
Level 
(Reading)
% at 
Grade 
Level 
(Reading)
Post*CM*BD -0.253 -0.2431 0.18 0.1815 -0.308 -0.2156 0.104 0.154 0.167 0.1965
[0.053]** [0.0480]** [0.054]** [0.0488]** [0.079]** [0.0815]** [0.050]* [0.0504]** [0.056]** [0.0583]**
Post*CM 5.249 - -5.896 - 9.103 - -0.206 - -1.911 -
[1.349]** - [1.397]** - [2.064]** - [1.294] - [1.482] -
Post 2.485 - -4.942 - 4.689 - 4.259 - 4.114 -
[0.391]** - [0.585]** - [0.599]** - [0.616]** - [0.563]** -
Post*BD -0.061 - 0.059 - 0.026 - 0.031 - 0.024 -
[0.026]* - [0.025]* - [0.031] - [0.018]+ - [0.015] -
School Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Locale*Year Dummies NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Census %Black Decile*Year Dummies NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
District*Year Dummies NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 2542 2503 2503 2503 2514 2475 1801 1777 1801 1777
Number of schools 431 419 419 419 431 419 370 358 370 358
R-squared 0.22 0.31 0.35 0.45 0.2 0.32 0.3 0.42 0.3 0.42
Robust standard errors in brackets. Clustered at the zip code level. The sample is CM, Wake, Guilford and Cumberland districts.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The Effect of the Policy Change on School Attribtes. The Dependent Variable is Above Each Column. (First Stage is Column 1)
Note: BD is the percentage of black students at the school (in 2000) minus the percentage of black residents in the block group or zip code (in 2000) in 
whitch the school is located. CM stands for Charlotte-Mecklenburg and Post denotes after the policy change (2003 onwards). The POST*CM*BD variable is 
a difference in difference in difference estimate.
The regression results in Table 2 show that the policy had a strong effect on the 
racial composition of students at the affected schools, and that CM schools with more 
black students than the neighborhood demographics would predict experienced an 
outflow of black students and an inflow of white students between 2002 and 2003 after 
busing ended. Specifically, the -0.253 coefficient for the variable t i iPOST CM BD    in 
column 1 indicates that a school in CM would have had a 0.25320=5.06 point greater 
increase in the percentage of black students between 2002 and 2003 than a school in CM 
over the same time period with a black differential 20 points higher (a one standard 
deviation difference in BD). The t-statistic on the coefficient is 4.77, indicating a strong 
first stage. The odd numbered columns show that relative to a school in CM with a BD of 
0, a school in CM with a BD of 20 would have had a 5.06 point decrease in the 
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percentage of black students, a 3.6 point increase in the percentage of white students, and 
a 6.16 point decrease in the percentage of students who are on free-lunch. CM schools 
also experienced changes in student achievement. Note that changes in achievement 
could also reflect the effect of teacher mobility, peer quality, or other unmeasured inputs 
that may be endogenous to student race rather than simply changes in the ability of 
students. A school in CM with a black differential of 20 would have experienced a 2.08 
and 3.34 point increase in the percentage of 3rd through 8th grade students at or above 
grade level in math and reading respectively, relative to a CM school with a BD of 0 over 
the same time period. 
While the DIDID specification is instructive, I augment model [1] to control for 
neighborhood characteristics and to allow for a more flexible specification. Specifically, I 
include year effects instead of a simple before/after dummy, use district fixed effects 
instead of a simple CM dummy and include neighborhood characteristics interacted with 
year fixed effects. More formally, I estimate equation [2] below by OLS.
6
2 3,
6 6
4, 5,
it t i i t i r r year r i
r r year r i r r year r i i it
Y POST CM BD POST BD I LOC
I DEC I DISTRICT
  
   

 
       
     

          [2]
All common variables are defined as in [1] and year rI  is an indicator variable equal to one
if the observation year is year r and zero otherwise. To control for underlying dynamics 
that may have had a differential effect across school districts, urban environments, and 
neighborhoods with different shares of black residents, I include interactions of 
year rI  dummies with indicators for each school district iDISTRICT , indicators for the 
urbanity of the surrounding area iLOC , and dummies denoting the ten deciles of the 
distribution of the percentage of black residents in the surrounding area iDEC . The 
results of this more flexible model are presented in the even numbered columns of Table 
2. The flexible specification yields similar results to those of equation [1] and is used for 
all subsequent analysis. 
In sum, Table 2 shows that the student body changed in a variety of ways 
associated with student race, such as income levels and achievement levels. For the 
remainder of the paper, I use the change in the percentage of black students to categorize 
18
the change in student demographics.  As such, the results on teacher characteristics must 
not be interpreted as being the result of teachers having preferences for student race per 
se, but the result of teachers having preferences for student or school characteristics that 
are endogenous to student race – such as student achievement, school culture, student 
behaviors and parental characteristics.
IV The Effect of the Policy Change on Teacher Characteristics 
In this section I analyze aggregate teacher data to determine the effect of the
policy change on teacher attributes. The teacher data were created by computing school-
level aggregate statistics from individual teacher data from the NCERDC. The rankings 
of the colleges or universities teachers attended were obtained by linking US News and 
World Report rankings from 2005 to the undergraduate institution data from the teacher 
education files. Teacher license score data were created by comparing each teacher’s 
score on the exam to all other teachers in the state in that year. Variables were created 
denoting if the teacher scored above the 75th percentile or the median on that exam in that 
year. Since teachers may have taken more than one exam, I code a teacher as having 
scored above the 75th percentile or the median if she has at least one score above the 75th
percentile or the median on any one exam. As such, more than half of the teachers would 
be expected to score above the median. Teacher value-added was computed by linking 
the student end-of-year test files with individual teacher data. Since teacher effectiveness 
could have been affected by changes that took place due to students’ demographics 
changing or teacher demographics changing between 2002 and 2003, teacher value-added
is estimated “out of sample” for the years 1995 through 2000.
While there are several specifications used in the literature to estimate teacher 
value-added, the estimated teacher fixed-effects across studies are surprisingly robust to 
the chosen specification.18 To identify effective teachers, I estimate teacher fixed-effects 
in a test score growth model of the form [3] using data on students in grades 3 through 5
from 1995 through 2000.19
                                                
18 For a detailed discussion of the theoretical and econometric assumptions underlying value-added 
specifications see Todd and Wolpin (2003).  
19 Researchers have pointed out that measurement error in the lagged test score could bias estimates of the 
coefficient of lagged test scores on test score growth. The common fix for this problem is to assume there is 
no serial correlation in the error terms over time and (where there is enough data) to instrument for lagged 
19
1 1 1 1 1 2 ' 1 1 3 4 5ijgt ijg t ijg t i jg t i st jt j t g jt ijgtA A A A X Z W                        [3]
In [3] ijgtA is the achievement score of student i with teacher j in grade g in year t, 
' 1 1i jg tA   are the average incoming test scores of a student’s classmates, iX is a vector of 
student characteristics such as ethnicity, gender and parental education level. jtW is a 
vector including teacher experience, class-size and variables denoting the gender and 
ethnic match between the student and the teacher.20 stZ is a vector of school attributes 
including the percent black, percent white, percent Hispanic, the percent free-lunch 
eligible students and the urbanicity of the school (whether the school is in a large city, 
medium sized city, urban fringe, suburban or rural area), t is a year fixed effect, g is a 
grade fixed effect, j is a teacher effect, jt is a classroom level error term and ijgt is the 
idiosyncratic student level error term. Since I need estimates of teacher value-added that 
are comparable across schools, grades and classes, I do not include school or student 
fixed-effects but rather include a set of demographic controls for the students and 
schools.21 Readers may be concerned that the included covariates do not adequately 
capture measures of school quality so that the teacher effects capture school, principal 
and other unobserved effects.22 While this is possible, these estimates are used in a 
within-school model on an out of sample period so that changes in the distribution of 
these estimates within schools over time will not be confounded with those unobservable 
                                                                                                                                                
test scores with the second lag of test score. The main results do not use this approach since it results in a 
small estimation sample that makes identification of teacher fixed-effects difficult. (I lose one additional 
year of data to include the second lag, resulting in an estimation sample of three years). I do however 
present results in Appendix Table 2 showing that making this correction yields similar results to the chosen 
specification despite producing noisier estimates.
20 The value-added results are robust to omitting the gender and ethnic match variables.
21 Specifications that include student or school fixed-effects identify teacher value-added based on within-
school or within-student variation. If teachers are very different across schools, then much of the variation 
in teacher quality (i.e. the cross-school variation) will be absorbed by the school fixed-effect, making 
estimated effects across schools impossible to compare. Including student fixed-effects further exacerbates 
this problem by only allowing comparisons of teachers who teach the same groups of students. If those 
teachers who teach the gifted and talented students are of different average quality than those who teach the 
regular students, the estimated teacher value-added can only be used to compare teachers who share the 
same students so that comparing teachers who teach different students (even within the same school) may 
be misguided.
22 Note that using within-school or within-students variation to identify teacher value-added loads any 
common effectiveness at a school on the school even if they are due to the teachers. Such models also lead 
to attenuated teacher effects if there are spillovers across teachers. However, results using student fixed 
effects are qualitatively similar to those presented here.
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school inputs. The estimates of regression equation [3] are in Appendix Table 1. The 
teacher value-added estimates j are standardized, normalized and linked to teachers in 
the 2000 through 2005 data and school level aggregates are computed. I also compute 
shrinkage estimates, or Empirical Bayes (EB) estimates, that shrink noisy teacher value-
added estimates toward zero for greater statistical precision. The details of how the EB 
estimates are constructed are in Appendix Note 1. Results using normalized teacher 
estimates directly from the regression are similar to those using the normalized EB 
estimates. 
It should be noted that not all teachers have estimated teacher effects since not all 
teachers teach basic English and math, and teachers who were not in the sample in 2000 
would not have estimated teacher value-added. As such, changes in the distribution of 
estimated teacher value-added within schools over time reflect changes in the distribution 
of those teachers who were in the sample in the year 2000, but not necessarily of new 
teachers or teachers who have experience but came from outside of North Carolina. Also, 
since I estimate teacher value-added for teachers in primary school between 1995 and 
2000, the school level aggregates are defined for schools that employed primary school 
teachers after 2000. Note that (1) primary schools make up about two thirds of all schools
in CM and (2) the findings are robust to looking at changes in teacher value-added for 
primary schools only. 
The lower panel of Table 1 summarizes the teacher variables used. Teacher 
turnover was somewhat higher in the large school districts than in the rest of the state 
(about 26 percent for CM, and 23 percent for the three comparison districts compared to 
about 20 percent for the rest of the state). Consistent with this, CM and the comparison 
districts have larger shares of rookie teachers and lower shares of experienced teachers. 
These districts also have a greater share of black teachers (about 24 percent for CM, and 
22 percent for the three comparison districts, compared to about 13.5 percent for the rest 
of the state), a greater share of teachers with advanced degrees and a greater share of 
teachers who attended a top 100 college than other schools in the state. 
To determine whether the change in student demographics affected schools’ 
overall teacher makeup, I run regressions of teacher characteristics on the percentage of 
black students. To use only variation in black enrollment shares that are attributable to 
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the policy change, I instrument for the percentage of black students with the triple 
differenced t i iPOST CM BD  variable from equation [2]. Specifically, I estimate the 
following system of equations by 2SLS.
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All variables are defined as in [2], and equation [4] is equation [2] with % Black as the 
dependent variable shown in column 2 of Table 2. In the second stage regression, the 
fitted values from [4] are used in place of %Blackit in [5].
23 The excluded instrument in 
[5] is the three way interaction t i iPOST CM BD  , and Yit is the teacher outcome for 
school i at time t. Since the model includes year effects by district, locale, and percent 
black in the neighborhood decile for each year, the parameter δ2 identifies the effect of an
inflow of black students that is arguably uncorrelated with those changes that may have 
naturally occurred across different neighborhoods over time.
To highlight the differences between the cross-sectional relationships and the 
relationships one observes based on the policy change, I also estimate a simple model of 
the outcome of interest on %Black and a constant (OLS regression). Table 3 documents 
the cross-sectional relationship between the percentage of black students at a school and 
various teacher characteristics in column 1. Column 2 presents results of an intermediate 
DIDID specification, and the Instrumental Variables DIDID (IV-DIDID) regression 
results are reported in column 3. Table 3 reports the coefficient on %Black for each 
outcome and each model.
The standard deviation of the change in %Black in CM between 2002 and 2003 is 
just over 10. This is also approximately the amount of variation associated with a two 
standard deviation difference in BD. Column 1 shows that in the cross-section, a school 
with 10 percentage points more black students would have 1.53 percentage points more 
                                                
23 Note: I estimate equations [4] and [5] by two-stage least squares using the xtivreg2 command in STATA. 
This command automatically adjusts the standard errors in the second stage for estimation error and uses 
the appropriate degrees of freedom adjustment.
22
teachers with zero to three years of experience, a teacher turnover rate 1.86 points higher, 
5.26 percentage points more black teachers, 5.28 percentage points fewer white teachers, 
0.73 percentage points fewer teachers with an advanced degree, 0.86 percentage points 
fewer teachers who attended a college ranked in the top 100, approximately 2 percentage 
points fewer teachers who score above the 75th percentile and the median on their 
certification exams and would have about 0.04 and 0.02 standard deviations lower mean 
teacher value-added in math and reading respectively. In sum, schools with large black 
enrollment shares have teachers with weaker observable characteristics on average.
Table 3
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
1 Mean Teacher experience -0.028 [0.006]** -0.0324 [0.0096]** -0.087 [0.038]* -0.088 [0.032]**
2 % Teachers: 1-3 years 0.153 [0.020]** 0.1036 [0.0460]* 0.163 [0.185] 0.256 [0.1390]+
3 % Teachers: 4-9 years -0.006 [0.018] 0.0395 [0.0426] 0.184 [0.099]+ 0.0982 [0.0833]
4 % Teachers: 10 to 20 years -0.096 [0.013]** -0.0654 [0.0361]+ -0.156 [0.125] -0.1526 [0.1108]
5 % Teachers: 21 years -0.051 [0.018]** -0.0777 [0.0318]* -0.191 [0.083]* -0.2016 [0.0718]**
6 % Teachers: leave current school 0.186 [0.023]** 0.1051 [0.0639] -0.123 [0.174] -0.0907 [0.1588]
7 Lag % teachers leave current school 0.167 [0.020]** 0.0561 [0.0680] -0.342 [0.230] -0.1394 [0.1514]
8 % Teachers: Black 0.526 [0.039]** 0.2165 [0.0510]** 0.373 [0.159]* 0.3566 [0.1618]*
9 % Teachers: White -0.528 [0.038]** -0.1864 [0.0503]** -0.299 [0.178]+ -0.2963 [0.1801]+
10 % Teachers: Higher degree -0.073 [0.019]** -0.0681 [0.0294]* 0.077 [0.145] -0.0722 [0.1242]
11 % Teachers: Top 50 college -0.05 [0.008]** -0.0172 [0.0174] 0.006 [0.047] -0.0065 [0.0542]
12 % Teachers: Top 100 college -0.086 [0.013]** -0.0328 [0.0240] -0.011 [0.071] -0.0327 [0.0741]
13 % Teachers: Top 10 score -0.133 [0.018]** -0.0873 [0.0414]* -0.13 [0.163] -0.2081 [0.1215]+
14 % Teachers: Top 25 score -0.205 [0.019]** -0.1538 [0.0607]* -0.177 [0.228] -0.2556 [0.1947]
15 % Teachers: Top 50 score -0.211 [0.022]** -0.082 [0.0502] -0.099 [0.159] -0.1465 [0.1325]
16 Mean teacher value added math -0.002 [0.001]* -0.0003 [0.0025] -0.015 [0.005]** -0.0134 [0.0045]**
17 Mean teacher value added math (EB) -0.004 [0.001]** -0.0034 [0.0022] -0.0206 [0.005]* -0.0197 [0.0049]*
18 Mean teacher value added reading 0.0002 [0.001] -0.0029 [0.0017]+ -0.013 [0.007]* -0.013 [0.0063]*
19 Mean teacher value added reading (EB) -0.0021 [0.001]* -0.0053 [0.0021]* -0.0224 [0.006]* -0.0224 [0.0057]**
School Effects
Year-by-District Effects
% Black decile-by-years effects
Locale-by-year effects
Robust standard errors in brackets to the right of point estimates. Standard errors clustered at the zip code level.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Dependent Variable
The Effect on the Percentage of Black Students at the School on Teacher Characteristics: The coefficient on the %Black at the school is reported. 
%Black ranges from 0 to 100.
1 3 42
OLS DIDID-IV DIDID-IV
NO YES YES
NO YES YES
Note: Each column-row combination represents a different regression. BD is the percentage of black students at the school (in 2000) minus the 
percentage of black residents in the block group or zip code (in 2000) in which the school is located. CM stands for Charlotte-Mecklenburg and Post 
denotes after the policy change (2003 onwards). The POST*CM*BD variable is a difference in difference in difference estimate. Qi denotes which of 
the five quintiles of the percentage of black residents distribution the school falls into. The sample is CM, Wake, Guilford and Cumberland districts 
[2503 observations and 419 schools].
NO YES YES
POST*CM*BD
NO YES YES
(POST*CM*BD)*QiExcluded Instrument
The excluded instrument in column 3 is the black differential of the school interacted with a dummy denoting CM district interacted with a dummy 
variable denoting after 2002. The excluded instruments in column 4 are the interactions of CM*BD*POST with indicator variables denoting five 
quintiles of the distribution of percent black in the surrounding neighborhood. 
DIDID
YES
YES
YES
YES
--
Column 2 shows an intermediate specification documenting the relationship 
between changes in student demographics within schools over time and changes in 
teacher characteristics so that the reader may see the marginal effect of going to the 
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instrumental variables model. As one can see, while the estimated coefficients in column 
2 are smaller than those in column 1, the results are qualitatively similar. Column 3 of 
Table 3 documents the relationship between student demographics and teacher 
characteristics using that variation that is due to the policy change. The IV-DIDID 
estimates show that a 10 point increase in the percentage black students due to the policy 
change is associated with a decrease of 0.8 years in the average experience of teachers at 
the school. This is much larger than the OLS and DIDID estimates of only 0.27 and 0.32 
years respectively. Rows 2 through 5 indicate that this is due to an increase in the share of 
teachers with less than ten years of experience and a decrease in the share of teachers 
with ten or more years of experience. 
Row 6 shows the surprising result that schools that had an inflow of black 
students did not experience a greater increase in turnover than schools that had an 
outflow. While schools with larger black enrollment shares have higher teacher turnover
in the cross-section, this relationship does not hold in the instrumental variables results
(in fact, the point estimate in column 3 is negative and not statistically significant). Since 
there was a period after which teachers would have known about the policy change but 
before students were actually moved, I also include the one year lag of turnover as a 
dependent variable. There was no statistically significant relationship between lagged 
turnover and an inflow of black students, and the point estimate is negative. The 
graphical analysis of teacher turnover in Section VI puts this surprising result in 
perspective.
Rows 8 and 9 show that the relationship between teacher race and student race is 
robust across specifications. However, the IV estimates indicate that a 10 point increase 
in the black enrollment share is associated with a 3.5 point increase in the black teacher 
share compared to 5.3 points in the OLS. The IV-DIDID coefficient is about two thirds as 
large as the OLS coefficient, suggesting that much of the correlation between teacher race 
and student race is an artifact of residential segregation. The fact that there is still a 
strong relationship in the IV-DIDID results is compelling evidence that the relationship 
between teacher race and student race is not simply an artifact of co-location due to 
residential segregation, but is due to something systematic about how teachers apply to or 
are placed in schools. Since there was no change in teacher placement policy, and race is 
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not explicitly used in the teacher hiring or placement procedure, it is reasonable to 
interpret this as a teacher labor supply response.
The results in column 3 of Table 3 show no systematic relationship between the 
percentage of black students and the percentage of teachers with an advanced degree or 
the percentage of teachers who attended top 50 or top 100 colleges. The point estimates 
have the opposite sign of the OLS and intermediate DIDID estimates. The point estimates 
in rows 13 through 15 suggest that an inflow of black students is associated with teachers 
with lower scores on their certification exams, but these estimates are not statistically 
significant at traditional levels. Rows 16 through 19 document the relationship between 
estimated teacher value-added (based on a pre-sample period) and the percentage of black 
students at the school. The IV-DIDID results indicate that a 10 point increase in the share 
of black students is associated with a 0.15 and 0.13 standard deviation decrease in the 
average teacher value-added in math and reading respectively. Using the Empirical Bayes 
teacher effects (rows 17 and 19) a 10 point increase in the share of black students is 
associated with a 0.21 and 0.22 standard deviation decrease in the average teacher value-
added in math and reading respectively. These effects are much larger than those from the 
OLS and the intermediate DIDID specifications.
In column 4, I interact the t i iPOST CM BD  variable with iQ (the quintile of the 
school in the percentage black in neighborhood distribution) to allow the instrument to 
have a differential effect on schools located in largely black neighborhoods as opposed to 
largely white neighborhoods.24 Figure 3 indicates that this is likely to improve the fit of 
the first stage and reduce noise in the second stage. Making this adjustment to the 
excluded instrument reduces the standard errors on most estimates. The results are largely 
the same as those of column 3. However in column 4 an increase in the share of black 
students is associated with a decrease in the share of teachers who score in the top 10% 
on the certification exam. This relationship is significant at the 10 percent level.  In 
column 4, even those outcomes that are not statistically significant have the expected sign 
and tell the same consistent story – schools that had an exogenous increase in the black 
                                                
24 There are several reasons why the BD may be a stronger predictor of changes in % Black in 
neighborhoods with more/less black residents. For example, if inflows of black students are more likely to 
induce private school going among whites in areas that already have a critical mass of black students, the 
BD would be a stronger predictor of inflows of black students in black neighborhoods than in white 
neighborhoods.
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enrollment share experienced a decrease in the observable and unobservable quality of 
teachers on average.
To provide a more nuanced picture of how the distribution of estimated teacher 
value-added changed within schools due to the policy change, Figure 4 shows the 
marginal effects of an inflow of black students on different percentiles of the value-added 
distribution for reading and math. The regression coefficients are reported in Appendix 
Table 2. Whether one uses EB estimates or the estimated teacher effects, the results are 
qualitatively the same – an increase in the share of black students is associated with a 
statistically significant decrease in the value-added of teachers at the school at all points 
in the value-added distribution.25
Figure 4
Coefficient on %Black Students on Percentiles of Teacher Value-
Added Distribution
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To put these results into perspective, consider the following “back of the 
envelope” calculation. Assume that under student busing the average black/white student 
attended a school that was 60 percent black/white, and after busing attended a school that 
was 75 percent black/white. Then they would, on average, be faced with teachers with
approximately 0.3 standard deviations lower/higher value-added in math and reading. 
This ignores any pre-existing differences that may exist across schools during busing. 
This would imply an increased teacher quality gap of about 0.6 standard deviations,
                                                
25 Appendix Table 1 also shows results using serial correlation adjusted value-added estimates, which are 
qualitatively similar. Using the second lag of test scores to correct for measurement error in lagged test 
scores reduces the sample of teachers with estimated effects to less than half of those when one uses the 
lagged test scores as is. This would explain the additional noise.
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which would imply an increased performance gap of 7.5 and 3.3 percent of a standard 
deviation in math and reading respectively.26 This is roughly the magnitude of having a 
first year teacher as opposed to a more experienced teacher. The estimated black-white 
test score gap in CM was about 1 standard deviation in 2001 in both math and reading. 
This suggests that the endogenous sorting of teachers with respect to student race could 
potentially explain between 3.3 and 7.5 percent of the black-white test score gap in CM.
V A Graphical Analysis of Teacher Turnover
It is somewhat surprising that the DIDID-IV regression results in section IV 
indicate that black students are not associated with higher turnover, so I present
descriptive statistics about teacher turnover to put these regression results in perspective. 
The top panel of Figure 5 shows the one-year teacher turnover rates (leaving their current 
school) by year for those CM schools with BDs above and below average. The first 
notable pattern is that while there are differences in turnover rates between low-BD and 
high-BD schools (i.e. low-BD schools with low black enrollment shares have slightly 
higher turnover than high BD schools with large black enrollments), the increases in 
turnover over time are almost identical for all schools. This is consistent with finding a 
statistically significant effect of percent black on turnover in the cross-section but no 
statistically significant differential effect of percent black on turnover in the IV-DIDID 
estimates in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3. The second notable pattern is that turnover is 
elevated for all CM schools between 2001 and 2003, suggesting that teachers may have 
been reacting to the change in student demographics and to the anticipated change in 
student demographics. Since a teacher sorting explanation would involve teachers 
switching schools rather than simply leaving their current school, the lower panel of 
Figure 5 looks specifically at teachers switching schools. The lower panel of Figure 5
                                                
26 This calculation is based on estimates from [Jackson and Bruegmann (2008)] who find that the 
coefficients on estimated standard normalized value-added estimates are 0.126 and 0.055 for math and 
reading respectively using these same data. Other studies have found that a one standard deviation increase 
in teacher quality increases student achievement by between 0.25 and 0.1 of a standard deviation [[Jacob 
and Lefgren (2007); Rockoff (2004); Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin (2005)]. The ‘back of the envelope’ 
calculations assume that teachers will be as effective in their new schools as they were in their previous 
schools. If some of the estimated teacher value-added is due to unobserved student characteristics or the 
match between certain students and certain teachers, then a teacher’s value-added in one school may not be 
predictive of her value-added in another school. Irrespective of how good a predictor estimated value-added 
is across schools, if a school loses those teachers with the highest estimated value-added, it implies that 
there is a real reduction in teacher quality
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shows a clear increase in teachers switching schools in 2002 that was obscured by 
looking at aggregate teacher turnover. Using simple t-tests, one can reject the hypothesis 
that switching is the same in 2002 as in 2001 or 2003 at the five percent level. The figure 
also shows that the vast majority of teacher switching is due to switching schools within 
CM rather than switching to schools outside the district. There is some evidence of 
increased switching to whiter neighborhoods in 2002, but some of this may simply be due 
to mean reversion.
Figure 5
If teachers were switching schools in 2002 because they all preferred to teach in 
schools that had a lower share of black students, one would observe (1) an increase in 
turnover for those schools that had an increase in the share of black students, (2) a 
decrease in turnover for those schools that had a decrease in the share of black students 
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and (3) that most of this change in turnover would be due to school switching. The 
dynamics documented in Figure 6 show that this was not the case. Both high-BD and 
low-BD schools experienced an increase in teachers switching out of their schools to 
other schools in the district in 2002. This dynamic is much more consistent with there 
being heterogeneity in teachers’ preferences for students, such that some teachers like 
teaching in schools with high shares of low-income minority students while other 
teachers do not.27 This would also explain why the aggregate regression results show no 
differential change in teacher turnover across schools despite a clear change in the 
characteristics of teachers within schools over time.
Figure 6
Readers may wonder if the movement of students systematically created job 
openings at schools that had an outflow of black students due to the policy change 
leading to a change in teacher demand. An instrumental variables regression of the share 
                                                
27 Anecdotal evidence and conversations with district officials suggest that many teachers avoid inner-city 
schools because they find those working conditions difficult, while other teachers seek them out because 
they want to make a difference to students who really need the help.
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of teachers that are new hires yields a coefficient on %Black of 0.009 and a standard error 
of 0.012. The standard error of the same OLS regression is 0.01 showing that this lack of 
significance is not due to increased noise from the IV procedure. If teachers had no 
preferences for student demographics, since there were not disproportionately more new 
hires (vacancies filled) at schools that lost or gained black students due to the policy 
change, they would be no more likely to apply for a transfer or leave their schools as 
before. Since the school district did not compel teachers to leave schools, the aggregate 
increase in teacher switching for all schools further suggests that the changes in mobility 
were likely due to a labor supply rather than a demand response.
VI The Effect of the Policy Change on Incumbent Teachers and New Hires
The changes in the aggregate documented in section IV may have occurred for 
three reasons; (1) schools that had an inflow of black students may have experienced an 
increased outflow of highly-qualified teachers, (2) schools that had an inflow of black 
students may have found it more difficult to attract new highly-qualified teachers than 
before the inflow of black students or (3) some combination of the two. I attempt to 
disentangle these two margins by looking at changes in the characteristics of teachers 
who remain in a school (teachers who did not leave their school the previous year) and 
changes in the characteristics of newly hired teachers. All the analyses in this section use
the IV-DIDID specification to remove potential endogeneity bias.
Table 4 reports the coefficient on %Black at the school on the characteristics of 
individual teachers. Columns 1 through 9 are based on the sample of teachers who remain 
in their school from the previous year, and columns 10 through 18 are based on the 
sample of new teachers. Table 4 reports the IV-DIDID results. All models include year-
by-district fixed effects, year-by-locale fixed effects school effects and post-by-BD 
effects. The results for incumbent teachers in columns 1 through 9 echo the aggregate 
teacher results. A school with a 10 point increase in the share of black students 
experienced a 1 year decline in the average years of experience among teachers who 
stayed in the school. These teachers who stayed after the policy change were about 3 
percentage points more likely to be black, and had about 0.14 standard deviations lower 
value-added in math and reading. These results imply that within a school, those teachers
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that left schools that experienced an inflow of black students were on average more
experienced, whiter, and had higher value-added than those who stayed. 
Table 4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Years of 
experience
less than 4 
years
4 to 10 
years
11 to 20 
years
more than 
20 years White Black
math effect 
EB
reading 
effect EB
Percent Black at school -0.10729 0.0037 0.00226 -0.00153 -0.00349 -0.00244 0.00299 -0.01368 -0.0139
[0.03582]** [0.00155]* [0.00135]+ [0.00109] [0.00154]* [0.00151] [0.00149]* [0.00415]** [0.00532]**
Observations 128105 128105 128105 128105 128105 128105 128105 26524 26524
Number of schools 419 419 419 419 419 419 419 412 412
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Years of 
experience
less than 4 
years
4 to 10 
years
11 to 20 
years
more than 
20 years White Black
math effect 
EB
reading 
effect EB
Percent Black at school 0.04085 -0.00187 -0.00058 0.00105 0.00061 -0.00281 0.00228 -0.0007 -0.0023
[0.06102] [0.00223] [0.00152] [0.00137] [0.00146] [0.00381] [0.00332] [0.01109] [0.01315]
Observations 24464 24464 24464 24464 24464 23969 23969 2580 2580
Number of schools 419 419 419 419 419 419 419 345 345
Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors clustered at the zip code level.
 + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% (sample is CM, Wake, Guilford and Cumberland districts)
Effect of Changes in Percent Black Students on Characteristics of Incumbent Teachers and New Hires
Incumbent Teachers
New Hires
Note: All regressions are based on the same IV-DIDID specification detailed in equations [4] and [5]. All regressions include year effects interacted 
with the school district, the decile of the school in the distribution of percent black in the neighborhood, and the locale. All specifications include 
school fixed effects and a POST*BD variable. The excluded instrument in these models is the POST*BD*CM variables interacted with the quintile of 
the school in the distribution of percent black residents from the 2000 census.
Columns 10 through 18 look at the attributes of new teachers that a school hires. 
None of these point estimates are statistically distinguishable from zero, suggesting that 
either the sample of new teachers is too small to detect differences, or there is no 
systematic difference in the characteristics of new teachers that schools hired after the 
policy change. However, the point estimates suggest that schools that experienced an 
inflow of black students were more likely to hire black teachers than before the policy 
change. 
The results in Table 4 suggest that white teachers, more experienced teachers, and 
teachers with high value-added were more likely to leave schools that experienced an 
inflow of black students than black teachers, teachers with less experience, and teachers 
with low estimated value-added. Direct tests for differential mobility across experience 
and value-added groups yield statistically insignificant results that are not generally 
robust across models. However, differential mobility by teacher race is a consistent 
finding across all models, and I present these results in Table 5.
The dependent variable in Table 5 is leaving the current school in that year. The 
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coefficient on percent black is reported and all models include the full set of control 
variables in model [4] and instrument for percent black using 2SLS. Columns 1 through 3 
show the effect on leaving the current school for black teachers and columns 4 through 6 
show the results for white teachers. Columns 1 and 3 that use the three way interaction as 
the excluded instrument show that black teachers are 6 percentage points less likely to 
leave a school when the share of black students increases by 10 percentage points, while 
white teachers are 1.5 percentage points less likely. The effect on black teachers is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level while that for white teachers (who are more 
numerous) is not significant at traditional levels. Columns 2 and 5 use the instrument 
interacted with the quintile of the percent black of the neighborhood as used in Table 3. 
These results are largely the same, but now the effect for black teachers is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. 
Table 5
1 2 3 4 5 6
IV-DIDID IV-DIDID IV-DIDID IV-DIDID IV-DIDID IV-DIDID
Leave 
current 
school
Leave 
current 
school
Leave 
current 
school
Leave 
current 
school
Leave 
current 
school
Leave 
current 
school
Percent Black -0.00617 -0.00761 - -0.00155 -0.00159 -
[0.00325]+ [0.00357]* - [0.00181] [0.00175] -
Percent Black in the following year - - -0.00095 - - <0.0001
- - [0.00043]* - - [0.00019]
Excluded Instruments 1 2 1 1 2 1
Observations 16706 16706 13480 64811 64811 52922
Number of schools 408 408 402 418 418 418
Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors clustered at the zip code level.
 + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Instrument 1 is the three way interaction BD*POST*CM, and instrument 2 is BD*POST*CM interacted with the 
quintile of the school in the percent black residents distribution. Sample is CM, Wake, Guilford and 
Cumberland schools.
Black Teachers White Teachers
Difference in Mobility Response by Race
Note: All regressions are based on the same IV-DIDID specification detailed in equations [4] and [5]. All 
regressions include year effects interacted with the school district, the decile of the school in the distribution of 
percent black in the neighborhood, and the locale. All specifications also include school fixed effects and a 
POST*BD variable. 
Since the analysis in Section V indicates that much teacher turnover and 
switching took place in 2002 rather than 2003 in anticipation of the change in student 
attributes, columns 3 and 6 use the percent black the following year as the independent 
variable. The instruments are also altered so that POSTt denotes the year before students 
moved. The results from this model indicate that black teachers were about 1 percentage 
point less likely to leave a school when the share of black students was expected to 
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increase by 10 percentage points, while there is no statistically significant differential 
effect for white teachers.
Readers may wonder if all of these differences were driven by sorting across race 
– i.e. the movement of black teachers, who may have had, on average, weaker 
qualifications and lower value-added. To determine if the changes in the aggregate were 
due to changes in the characteristics of white teachers, changes in the characteristics of 
black teachers or simply due to changes in the racial make-up of teachers, I estimate 
equations [4] and [5] on mean teacher experience and mean teacher value-added in math 
and reading for black and white teachers separately. Among white teachers, a 10 point 
increase in the percentage of black students is associated with a statistically significant 
1.02 reduction in mean years of teaching experience and statistically insignificant 1
percent of a standard deviation decreases in mean value-added for both math and reading. 
Surprisingly, among black teachers these effects are even stronger. A 10 point increase in 
the percentage of black students is associated with a statistically significant 1.74 
reduction in mean years of teaching experience and statistically significant 30 and 39
percent of a standard deviation decreases in mean value-added for math and reading 
respectively. This implies that even though black teachers were more likely to stay in 
schools with growing black enrollment shares, on average, those black teachers who left 
were better than those black teachers who remained. These results show that inflows of 
black students are associated with decreases in the average quality of both black and 
white teachers. This is compelling evidence that sorting by student race occurs both 
across and within teacher race - implying that while teachers’ preferences for student race 
may be associated with teacher race, there is substantial heterogeneity in teacher 
preferences for student race among both white and black teachers.
In sum, schools that experienced an exogenous increase in the black enrollment
share were relatively more likely to lose white teachers, experienced teachers and 
effective math and reading teachers. The DIDID-IV estimates indicate that black teachers 
were less likely to leave schools, while white teachers were not differentially affected by
an exogenous inflow of black students. While the point estimates show that schools that 
had increasing black enrollment shares hired new teachers with lower estimated value-
added than before the inflow, these new hire results are not statistically significant.
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VI Concluding remarks
The regression results show that the change from a race-based busing policy to a 
neighborhood-based controlled school choice model changed the student make-up of 
schools in CM in a clear and foreseeable way. As predicted by the instrument, schools 
that had a greater share of black students than black residents in the surrounding 
neighborhood experienced an outflow of black students and an inflow of white students. 
The converse was also true. The sudden inflow or outflow of black students as a result of 
the policy change was associated with systematic changes in the make-up of teachers at 
the affected schools. Schools that experienced an increase in the black enrollment share 
saw a decrease in the proportion of experienced teachers, a decrease in the proportion of 
teachers with high scores on their licensure exams and a decrease in teacher value-added. 
I find that the aggregate decline in teacher quality in schools with increased black 
enrollment shares was due to these schools losing experienced and effective teachers. I 
find that white teachers were, on average, no more likely to leave schools that 
experienced an inflow of black students than other schools, while black teachers were, on 
average, more likely to stay in schools that had an exogenous increase in the black 
enrollment share. This suggests that the relationship between teacher race and student 
race is not a mere artifact of co-location but likely the result of teacher preferences for 
student attributes that are correlated with race. While discrimination against black 
teachers at schools that had increasing white enrollment shares is consistent with the 
patterns for black teachers, it does not explain the fact that inflows of black students are 
associated with decreases in the average quality of both black and white teachers –
making a discrimination explanation unlikely.
District employees assert that since there were no changes in CM hiring practices 
that went along with the change in the student assignment policy, these changes in 
teacher characteristics are driven by teacher labor supply. In addition, empirical evidence 
supports this interpretation. Specifically: (1) New teacher hiring (vacancies) is not 
correlated with the direction of the flow of black students due to the policy change, (2) all 
schools in the district experienced increased turnover, suggesting a re-sorting of teachers 
rather than a general movement of teachers from certain schools to others with vacancies
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and (3) teachers switched schools in anticipation of the demographic changes. While I 
cannot definitively rule out a demand side explanation, the bulk of the evidence supports 
a labor supply interpretation.
The dynamics of teacher turnover are consistent with a world in which some 
teachers prefer to teach in inner-city schools with low-income ethnic minority students 
while others prefer not to. These preferences appear to be correlated with teacher race,
such that, on average, black teachers may have a greater preference for teaching in 
schools with larger shares of black students. However, I find that much sorting occurs 
within both white and black teacher populations. The theory of compensating differentials 
predicts that where teachers have heterogeneous preferences for student characteristics, if
students are re-shuffled (as they were), teachers would also re-sort across schools. In fact,
this is exactly the type of dynamic one observes in the data. The fact that “movers” and 
“stayers” may have very different preferences, as a result of sorting, suggests that 
estimates that look at changes in teacher behaviors, on the margin, could grossly 
overstate or understate the overall or average effect of school characteristics on teacher 
mobility. This also suggests that compensating differentials estimated based on mobile 
teachers may be very different from that for the average teacher.
Overall, the findings present some of the first compelling evidence that teacher 
characteristics and teacher quality are endogenous to student demographics. One can 
reject the hypothesis that that the correlation between teacher quality and student 
demographics is merely an artifact of geography or residential segregation. The teacher 
sorting is probably responsible for some of the disparities in teacher qualifications that 
exist between low-income inner-city schools and affluent suburban schools, which in turn 
may be responsible for some of the cross-school achievement gaps that exist. The 
endogeneity of teacher quality with respect to student characteristics also suggests that 
the movement of effective teachers out of schools in predominantly black neighborhoods 
may be partially responsible for the increase in the black-white achievement gap 
associated with the end of school desegregation and residential segregation. An important
implication of these findings is that policy-makers should be cautious when advocating 
policies that require the re-shuffling of students across schools such as vouchers, school 
choice, district consolidation, or school busing. Insofar as student characteristics affect 
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where teachers teach, the change in teacher attributes caused by the re-shuffling of 
students across schools needs to be taken into account to determine the overall 
anticipated effect of such policies.  
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APPENDIX
Appendix Table 1
-1 -2 1 2
Math Reading Math Reading
lagged score -0.2522 -0.2594 Class Size -0.0021 -0.0011
[0.0036]** [0.0018]** [0.0004]** [0.0003]**
Peers: lagged score -0.1405 -0.0873 School: Urban fringe (Large City) 0.0042 0.0476
[0.0077]** [0.0077]** [0.0202] [0.0178]**
Student: Male -0.0085 -0.0489 School: Mid sized City -0.042 0.0005
[0.0015]** [0.0016]** [0.0205]* [0.0166]
Student: Black -0.257 -0.1879 School: Urban fringe (mid-sized City) -0.0285 0.0282
[0.0049]** [0.0043]** [0.0205] [0.0179]
Student: Hispanic -0.1077 -0.0447 School: Large town 0.068 0.0727
[0.0055]** [0.0055]** [0.0392]+ [0.0337]*
Student: American Indian -0.2108 -0.1294 School: Small town -0.0157 0.0381
[0.0070]** [0.0072]** [0.0223] [0.0191]*
Student: Mixed -0.1563 -0.0764 School: Rural (inside CBSA) -0.0104 0.0387
[0.0070]** [0.0074]** [0.0204] [0.0178]*
Student: White -0.1151 -0.0396 School: Rural (outside CBSA) -0.0074 0.0344
[0.0045]** [0.0045]** [0.0197] [0.0174]*
Parental Education: High-school graduate 0.1246 0.1317 School: Log Enrollment -0.0051 0.0041
[0.0023]** [0.0021]** [0.0099] [0.0078]
Parental Education: Some College 0.1943 0.2004 School: %White 0.3944 0.2903
[0.0033]** [0.0030]** [0.0891]** [0.0725]**
Parental Education: Professional graduate school 0.2127 0.223 School: %Hispanic 0.3164 0.226
[0.0032]** [0.0026]** [0.1261]* [0.1014]*
Parental Education: Junior College graduate 0.2916 0.291 School: %Black 0.1812 0.1749
[0.0037]** [0.0027]** [0.0899]* [0.0733]*
Parental Education: College 0.3421 0.3352 School: %Free-Lunch Eligible -0.0093 -0.0518
[0.0044]** [0.0032]** [0.0232] [0.0190]**
Parental Education: Grad School 0.3865 0.3741
[0.0062]** [0.0053]**
Teacher and Student are same Race 0.0022 -0.0013 Year Fixed ffects? YES YES
[0.0019] [0.0019] Grade Fixed Effects? YES YES
Teacher and Student are same Sex 0.0058 -0.0015 Observations 1257510 1249391
[0.0015]** [0.0016] Number of teachers 30974 30888
Teacher: 0 years experience -0.0478 -0.0201 Fraction of variance due to TFX 0.321 0.273
[0.0196]* [0.0171] R-squared 0.18 0.16
Teacher: 1-3 years experience -0.0036 -0.0063 Robust standard errors in brackets
[0.0182] [0.0164] + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Teacher: 4-10 years experience 0.0118 -0.0081
[0.0179] [0.0163]
Teacher: 10-24 years experience 0.0177 0.0008
[0.0187] [0.0170]
Teacher: 25+ years experience -0.0015 -0.007
[0.0207] [0.0183]
Regression Estimates of Test Score Growth Cont'd
All regressions include an indicator for missing parental education. 
The reference teacher experience group is teachers with missing 
experience data. Coefficients for the "other" student ethnicity 
category are suppressed.
Appendix Note 1:   Empirical Bayes Estimates
It has been pointed out that while teacher effects that come directly from [3] 
should yield consistent estimates of teacher value-added under the identifying restrictions, 
these estimates are not the most efficient. A more efficient estimate of teacher value-
added is the Empirical Bayes (EB) estimate that shrinks noisy value-added estimates 
towards the mean of the value-added distribution (in this case zero). Since the estimates 
are estimated with noise then ˆ j j ju   , where ju is random estimation error and 
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(0, ( ))j N Var  , so that the total variance of the estimated effects is 
ˆ( ) ( ) ( )j jVar Var Var u   . It is straightforward to show that in the presence of 
estimation error 2 2 2ˆ ˆ[ | ] ( / ( ))
jj j u j
E          . The empirical analog of this conditional 
expectation is an Empirical Bayes estimate of teacher value-added.
I follow the procedure outlined in Kane and Staiger (2008) to compute the EB 
estimates. This approach accounts for the fact that (1) teachers with larger classes will 
tend to have more precise value-added estimates and (2) there are classroom level 
disturbances so that teachers with multiple classrooms will have more precise value-
added estimates. To simplify the notation, I subsume all observed covariates into a single 
variable jtX and drop the grade subscript g to re-write equation [3] as [A1] below.
1ijt ijt jt j jt ijtA A X        [A1]
In [A1], the total error term is ijt j jt ijtz      . Since the student error component is 
equal to zero in expectation, the mean residual for classroom jt, jt j jtc    , contains the 
teacher effect and the idiosyncratic classroom error. Since the classroom error is 
randomly distributed, I use the covariance between the mean residuals of adjacent 
classrooms for the same teacher 21 ˆcov( , )jt jtc c   as an estimate of the variance of true 
teacher quality. I use the variance of the classroom demeaned residuals as an estimate of 
2ˆ . Since the variance of the residuals is equal to the sum of the variances of the true 
teacher effects, the classroom effects, and the student errors, I compute the variance of 
the classroom errors 2 by subtracting 2 and 2 from the total variance of the residuals. 
For each teacher, I compute a weighted average of their mean classroom 
residuals, where classrooms with more students are more heavily weighted. Specifically I 
compute
2 2
2 2
1
1
(1/ ( ( / ))
(1/ ( ( / ))
j
j
T
jt
j jt T
t jtt
N
z
N
 
 
 
  
 
  . [A2]
Where jtN is the number of students in classroom jt, and jT is the total number of
classrooms for teacher j. To obtain an EB estimate for each teacher, I multiply the 
weighted average of classroom residuals j by an estimate of its reliability. Specifically, 
I compute
2 2 2ˆ ˆ ˆ/ ( )
j
EB
j j u        [A3]
where   12 2 21(1/ ( ( / ))jj Tu jtt N      is the estimation variance of the raw value-
added estimate. The shrinkage factor 2 2 2ˆ ˆ/ ( )
ju    is the ratio of signal variance to total 
variance and is a measure of how reliable an estimate j is for j .
This EB method which has also been used in Gordon, Kane, and Staiger (2006),
Jacob and Lefgren (2008) and Rockoff, (2004) is intuitively appealing as it uses all the 
available information to “shrink” noisy teacher value-added estimates to yield efficient 
value-added estimates. While the results using the EB estimates are stronger than those 
using the raw value-added estimates, in practice, this adjustment does not qualitatively 
change the results.
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Appendix Table 2
Percentile
5 -0.004 [0.013] 0.001 [0.009] -0.014 [0.013] -0.018 [0.009]+ -0.009 [0.012] -0.021 [0.011]+
10 -0.015 [0.009]+ -0.008 [0.008] -0.018 [0.011] -0.022 [0.009]* -0.011 [0.010] -0.015 [0.010]
15 -0.013 [0.010] -0.009 [0.008] -0.014 [0.013] -0.021 [0.008]* -0.008 [0.009] -0.009 [0.009]
20 -0.02 [0.010]+ -0.017 [0.008]* -0.012 [0.015] -0.02 [0.009]* -0.009 [0.009] -0.001 [0.010]
25 -0.014 [0.010] -0.018 [0.009]* -0.007 [0.014] -0.019 [0.010]+ -0.01 [0.009] -0.001 [0.009]
30 -0.014 [0.008]+ -0.016 [0.007]* -0.011 [0.012] -0.017 [0.009]+ -0.008 [0.008] -0.002 [0.008]
35 -0.009 [0.007] -0.021 [0.008]** -0.012 [0.008] -0.022 [0.009]* -0.005 [0.007] -0.002 [0.007]
40 -0.013 [0.007]+ -0.023 [0.007]** -0.018 [0.007]* -0.027 [0.009]** -0.009 [0.008] -0.005 [0.006]
45 -0.014 [0.007]* -0.023 [0.006]** -0.019 [0.007]** -0.028 [0.009]** -0.01 [0.008] -0.008 [0.006]
50 -0.015 [0.006]* -0.026 [0.006]** -0.017 [0.006]** -0.03 [0.008]** -0.011 [0.007] -0.006 [0.005]
55 -0.016 [0.005]** -0.029 [0.006]** -0.017 [0.006]** -0.03 [0.007]** -0.011 [0.007]+ -0.006 [0.006]
60 -0.013 [0.005]* -0.028 [0.006]** -0.015 [0.006]* -0.029 [0.006]** -0.011 [0.006]+ -0.005 [0.006]
65 -0.015 [0.006]** -0.025 [0.005]** -0.014 [0.005]** -0.03 [0.006]** -0.01 [0.007] -0.006 [0.007]
70 -0.017 [0.005]** -0.028 [0.006]** -0.012 [0.005]** -0.029 [0.006]** -0.014 [0.007]+ -0.006 [0.008]
75 -0.016 [0.007]* -0.027 [0.005]** -0.016 [0.006]* -0.028 [0.007]** -0.018 [0.008]* -0.011 [0.009]
80 -0.014 [0.008]+ -0.027 [0.005]** -0.012 [0.007]+ -0.024 [0.006]** -0.023 [0.009]* -0.013 [0.009]
85 -0.015 [0.009]+ -0.023 [0.005]** -0.013 [0.008] -0.017 [0.005]** -0.028 [0.011]** -0.017 [0.010]+
90 -0.004 [0.009] -0.018 [0.005]** 0.002 [0.008] -0.013 [0.005]* -0.016 [0.011] -0.007 [0.009]
95 -0.009 [0.010] -0.02 [0.007]** -0.001 [0.012] -0.013 [0.007]* -0.012 [0.012] -0.01 [0.013]
Robust standard errors in brackets to the right of estimates.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Note: All regressions are based on the same IV-DIDID specification detailed in equations [4] and [5]. All regressions include year effects interacted 
with the school district, the decile of the school in the distribution of percent black in the neighborhood, and the locale. All specifications also include 
school fixed effects and a POST*BD variable. The excluded instrument is the three way interaction BD*POST*CM interacted with the quintile of the 
school in the percent black residents distribution. Math and Reading are the normalized value-added estimates that come directly from equation [3]. 
Math EB and reading EB are the Empirical Bayes estimates from equation [3]. Math Adjusted and Reading Adjusted are the normalized value-added 
estimated obtained from a 2SLS procedure that uses the second lag of test scores as an instrument for the first lag of test scores in equation [3]. The 
lack of statistical significance for these two outcome reflect the fact that the sample of teachers with estimated value-added under this method 
effectively shrinks by half.
Coefficient on %Black for different percentiles of the value-added distribution
Math Math EB Reading Reading EB Math Adjusted Reading Adjusted
